6 Mar, 2009

Bahrain: Violation of Personal Privacy

6 Feb 2009 On Wednesday, 25 February 2009, the Bahrain Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA) issued a public charter on a draft regulatory terms on the provision of technical facilities to support “national security requirements”. As per the TRA charter, and based on Article 78 of the Telecommunications Law, licensed operators are to provide all necessary technical capabilities to ensure the legal access to relevant security bodies through their communication networks. In the proposed regulation, the TRA aims, among other things, to regulate the means through which operations listed in Article (78) of the Act are facilitated.

Mr. Mohammed Mahmood-Director of Operations and Technical Affairs at the TRA stated that:”In the context of cooperation with other national bodies, the TRA deals with matters relating to the legalization of access of security agencies to information, archived data and other security issues involved in the regulation itself. We are confident that these issues will be adequately considered by all licensed operators''.

As per other officials at the TRA, the regulation requires significant changes to the core network of the operator licensee and that all operators are urged to consider the draft document and submit their comments by the deadline- March 26.

The Bahrain Center for Human Rights (BCHR) expresses its concerns over these move intending to provide a legal mandate to intrude into residents privacy and in particular dissidents and rights defenders.

BCHR president Nabeel Rajab commented on the TRA 's decision , saying, “Although Infringing privacy of activists has always been a practice by the Bahraini authorities, but what is more dangerous this time is that they are legalizing it under the pretexts of national security” He added “this as violations to personal privacy as well as the Constitution of Bahrain”.

BCHR urge the Bahraini Authorities to respect the human right values and principles in particular personal privacy, and are asked to: - Call off this plan of legalizing infringement of personal privacy for security grounds. - Stop targeting dissidents and human rights defenders and provide legalized cover to protect them instead of breaking their privacy in order to incriminate them. - Respect its constitution and acceded international conventions

3 Mar, 2009

Bahrain: Deteriorating situation for human rights defenders

Posted on 2009/03/02

Human rights defenders in Bahrain are facing increasing repression. The authorities have sought to target independent human rights defenders and their organisations and restrict human rights activities.

Human Rights defenders have been subjected to intimidation, arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment, fabricated judicial proceedings, threats and harassment. In 2009 Human rights defenders in Bahrain are clearly facing a series of severe violations of their legitimate rights to promote, protect, and defend human rights in Bahrain.

Further Information On the 10th of February, the name of human rights defender Abbass Abdulaziz Al-Omran, board member of BCHR, was included in the indictment that Bahrain's Public Prosecutor sent to the Grand Criminal Court in connection with case number 1403/2008 which deals with the alleged “terror plot”.

Al-Omran has been a member of BCHR since 2002 and became a board member of the BCHR in 2008. He is heavily involved in the activities of the Committee of Unemployed and Low-waged Workers, the Committee of Martyrs and Victims of Torture, and the Committee of Families of Detainees.

On the 11th of February 2009 human rights defender Sayed Sharaf S.Ahmed was arbitrarily arrested and taken from his house. Ahmed is an elected board member of the National Committee of Martyrs and Victims of Torture in Bahrain. He also participated in and organised many peaceful demonstrations in his home city, Sitra, to support the rights of prisoners. No arrest warrant was shown and no reasons were given for his arrest. Since his arrest, he has not been allowed to communicate with his family or lawyer.

On the 4th of February 2009, at approximately 2.45 a.m., the houses of both human rights defender Ali Hassan Salman and human rights defender Jaafar Kadhim Ebrahim were raided by security forces. Ali Hassan Salman was arrested and beaten in front of his family during the raid, causing his mother to faint. His glasses were also broken. Jaafar Kadhim Ebrahim, who lives in the same area, was arrested within 15 minutes. No arrest warrant was shown and no reasons were given for either of the arrests.

Since their arrest, Ali Hassan Salman and Jafaar Kadhim Ebrahim have not been allowed to communicate with their families or lawyers. Both human rights defenders have worked for the Committee of Activists and Prisoners of Conscience since December 2007 and have helped to organise peaceful marches and protests for the rights of detainees.

In the light of these well-documented violations and increasing repression, on 13th of February eight prominent figures in Bahrain,including human rights defenders Abdulhadi Al-Kawaja, former president of the BCHR and Dr Abduljalil Al Singace, head of the human rights unit of the Haq Movement of Liberties and Democracy in Bahrain, started a hunger strike demanding the release of prisoners of conscience. The hunger strike attracted several thousand supporters who visited Nuwaidrat, where the strike was being held, a village South West of the capital Manama. The participants in the hunger strike announced on Sunday the 22th of February that they intended to end their hunger strike on the 24th of February 2009.

Front Line believes strongly that human rights defenders in Bahrain are being targeted because of their legitimate and peaceful activities in defence of human rights, in particular their exercise of the right to freedom of expression and assembly. Front Line calls on the authorities in Bahrain to:

1. Guarantee the safety and freedom of movement of all human rights defenders in Bahrain.

2. Put an end to all forms of discrimination and repression against human rights defenders or their organizations and adopt, with the utmost urgency, every possible step to effectively help non-governmental human rights organisations to function freely in the promotion and protection of fundamental human rights.

3. To abide by the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders and other international standards ratified by Bahrain.

2 Mar, 2009

U.S State Department Human Rights Report Bahrain 2008

2008 Human Rights Report: Bahrain Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor

2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices

February 25, 2009

Bahrain is a monarchy with a population of approximately 1,050,000, including approximately 530,000 who are citizens. King Hamad Bin Isa Al-Khalifa is the head of state and all branches of government. The king appoints a cabinet of ministers; half are members of the minority Sunni Al‑Khalifa ruling family. The 2002 constitution reinstated a legislative body with one elected chamber, the Council of Deputies, and one appointed chamber, the Shura Council. All political societies participated in the 2006 parliamentary and municipal elections. Trained local observers did not report significant problems during the elections, although allegations persisted that the government manipulated general poll center vote counts in some cases and gerrymandered political districts. Civilian authorities generally maintained effective control of the security forces.

Citizens did not have the right to change their government. The government restricted civil liberties, including freedoms of press, speech, assembly, association, and some religious practices. Domestic violence against women and children persisted, as did discrimination on the basis of gender, religion, nationality, and sect, especially against the Shia majority population. Trafficking in persons and restrictions on the rights of expatriate workers remained problems.

On January 8, the government passed comprehensive antitrafficking legislation that provides for significant fines and jail time for trafficking in persons. On December 23, the government successfully prosecuted its first case under this law.


Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From:

a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life

There were no reports that the government or its agents committed politically motivated killings during the year; however, in December 2007 Ali Jasem died after participating in a protest where Shia activists clashed with security forces. The official autopsy reported he died of "acute cardiovascular and respiratory collapse" after running more than two miles, but local human rights observers alleged his death was linked to inhaling tear gas used to disperse demonstrators.

b. Disappearance

There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The constitution prohibits such practices; however, there were allegations during the year that security forces employed them.

On several occasions during the year, police detained dozens of young men in connection with small but frequent skirmishes between police and youths throwing rocks and Molotov cocktails. These youths routinely alleged that while in custody, security forces beat them. Security forces denied the accusations, and some opposition political activists expressed doubt about some of the allegations.

Following December 2007 protests, security forces arrested and detained dozens of protestors in the Adliya jail. Some detainees reported that judicial interrogators beat and electrocuted them in prison. One detainee, Maytham Badr al-Shaykh, alleged that interrogators sexually assaulted and electrocuted him. Officials denied the allegations of abuse. On April 6 and 9, a court-appointed medical team examined the detainees, and on April 10, the team testified that they could neither prove nor disprove the defendants' accusations of abuse. The government denied the allegations, and on July 13, the high criminal court sentenced 11 of the 15 defendants to between one and seven years' imprisonment. The 11 lost their appeal on December 28.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

According to previous reports, prisons generally met international standards, although the government did not permit any independent inspections. Throughout the year some detainees alleged that prison and detention facility guards physically abused them, a charge that the government denied. Court-ordered medical examinations of those alleging abuse were inconclusive.

The quasi-governmental Supreme Council for Women (SCW) conducted the most recent visit of the country's women's prison in Isa Town in 2006. There was no publicly released SCW report on the visit.

Although International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) officials visited the country during the year, they did not request prison visits.Bahrain Red Crescent Society officials reported that ICRC officials had not visited prisons since the release of all political prisoners in 2000.

d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention

The constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the government generally observed these prohibitions, although there were some allegations to the contrary.

Role of the Police and Security Apparatus

The Ministry of the Interior (MOI) is responsible for public security. It controls the Public Security Force and the extensive security service, which are responsible for maintaining internal order. The Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) is responsible for defending against external threats and also monitors internal security. The security forces were generally effective in maintaining internal order.

A widespread lack of transparency made corruption in the security services difficult to assess. The press reported that in a number of cases, authorities jailed and/or fined law enforcement officials for misconduct, most often for accepting bribes.

On November 22, the MOI announced that it disciplined 23 police officers during the year for committing human rights abuses. They received prison time and/or fines. The MOI maintained a hot line for citizens to report police abuses; however, many in the Shia community believed that the MOI condoned police activities and therefore did not report allegations of abuse. In practice the MOI responded to allegations of abuse and public complaints by establishing ad hoc investigation committees. These committees did not issue public reports of their findings.

Arrest and Detention

To apprehend felony suspects, the police must convince a judge based on evidence to issue an arrest warrant, which the police present to suspects upon arrest. Police and security forces must transfer suspects to the Public Prosecutor's Office within 48 hours, and they generally respected that requirement in practice. Within seven days of arrest, a detainee must appear before a judge in the Public Prosecutor's Office. If the judge decides the suspect is a flight risk or a danger to society, he may allow up to an additional 45 days of detention while the Public Prosecutor's Office conducts an investigation. This process may continue through subsequent reviews by different judges, but pretrial detention may not exceed six months. Judges may grant bail to a suspect and did so regularly.

The 2006 counterterrorism legislation allows the public prosecution to detain a terrorism suspect for a five-day period. Upon request the public prosecutor may extend this period based on the needs of the investigation for up to an additional 10 days. At the end of this period, the detainee must be transferred to the public prosecution and questioned within three days. The public prosecutor must then decide to issue a detention order or to release the detainee. The detention order may not exceed 60 days.

Detainees were generally allowed prompt access to visiting family members. Detainee access to attorneys was often restricted in the early stages of detention; attorneys must seek a court order to confer with clients. The state provided counsel to indigent detainees.

On June 5, authorities released Khalid Nour and Hussain al-Ali on bail; police arrested the two in September 2007 on charges of taking an illegal commission and held them for 48 hours without access to an attorney. At year's end, the case remained pending.

Amnesty On July 30, the king announced an amnesty for nearly 225 persons, including many charged for rioting. The government required those arrested for rioting to sign a pledge not to riot again. Seventy individuals refused to sign the pledge; they were released on August 2.

On September 2, the king pardoned 136 persons convicted of crimes. Many had been detained and charged with riot-related offenses; others were common criminals.

On January 31, the amnesty for illegal immigrants that began in August 2007 ended. At the end of the amnesty, 12,897 workers had returned to their home countries, 29,804 workers had transferred to a new employer, and 13,641 had renewed their expired visas, all without paying fines.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

The constitution provides for an independent judiciary. In contrast to previous years, the government generally respected judicial independence in practice. During the year the government lost cases or had appeals result in lighter sentences than sought by prosecutors. For example, on January 16, a judge sentenced the defendants in a prominent counterterrorism case to six months' imprisonment over the objections of the public prosecutor and political leaders, who had publicly called for lengthy prison terms. Some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) alleged that many resident alien judges were susceptible to pressure from the government, a charge the government denied. There were also allegations of corruption in the judicial system; however, those alleging corruption provided no evidence. The constitution provides that the king appoint all judges by royal decree. The king also serves as chairman of the Supreme Judicial Council, the body responsible for supervising the work of the courts and the public prosecution.

The legal system is based on a mix of British civil law, common law, Shari'a (Islamic law), and traditional laws. The judiciary is comprised of civil law courts and Shari'a courts.

The civil law courts adjudicate all civil and commercial cases, criminal cases, and personal status cases among non–Muslims. The courts of minor cases (the lower courts and the Court of Execution) have one judge, while the high courts have three judges with jurisdiction over felonies, personal status cases, and appeals.

The Shari'a courts have jurisdiction over personal status cases involving citizen and noncitizen Muslims. There are separate courts for Sunni and Shia Muslims, each of which has three levels: the Shari'a court, the High Shari'a Court, and the High Shari'a Court of Appeal. The High Shari'a Court of Appeal is composed of a minimum of two judges. In the event of a disagreement, the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs (MOJIA) provides a third judge, and the decision is based on a majority vote. There are 13 judges in the Sunni Maliki Shari'a courts and 14 judges in the Shi'a Ja'afari Shari'a courts.

The Constitutional Court provides final and binding ruling on the constitutionality of laws and statutes. The court's membership consists of a president and six members, all appointed by the king to nine-year terms that may not be abridged.

The BDF maintains a separate court system that tries only military personnel accused of offenses under the Military Code of Justice. The MOI has a similar system for trying police officials. There were no reports of either court considering cases involving civilian, common criminal, or security cases during the year.

Trial Procedures

According to the constitution, defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty. Civil and criminal trial procedures provided for an open trial. Juries are not used. By law and in practice, defendants have the right to prompt consultation with an attorney of their choice within 48 hours, and the government provided counsel to indigent defendants. Defendants are present during trial proceedings, and they have the right to present witnesses and evidence on their behalf and question witnesses against them. No law governs defendants' access to government-held evidence, and the government often reviewed evidence prior to defendants' access to it. Women's legal rights varied according to Shia or Sunni interpretations of Islamic law.

Political Prisoners and Detainees

There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees.

Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies

Citizens may bring civil suits before the court seeking cessation of or damages for human rights violations; however, the government maintained that the 2001 general amnesty granted immunity for alleged human rights violations committed prior to 2001.

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

The constitution provides for personal freedom and freedom from arbitrary interference with privacy, home, and correspondence except under the provisions of the law and under judicial supervision. The government is required to obtain a court order before monitoring telephone calls, e-mail, and personal correspondence. Many Shia believed police informer networks were extensive and sophisticated but were unable to provide concrete evidence.

Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

The constitution provides for restricted freedom of speech and of the press, but the government limited the exercise of these rights in practice. Both censorship and self-censorship took place.

The law forbids any speech or discussion infringing on public order or morals. In private settings individuals openly expressed critical opinions regarding domestic political and social issues. There was also considerable freedom of expression on the Internet, in letters to the editor, and occasionally on state-run television call-in shows.

The government did not own any print media, but the Ministry of Information (MOINFO) exercised considerable control over local, privately owned print media. The government owned and operated all local radio and television stations and vetted the selection of the country's Al—Jazeera correspondent. Radio and television broadcasts in Arabic, Farsi, and English from countries in the region, including by satellite, were received without interference.

The government enforced at its discretion the press law to restrict freedom of speech and press. The law provides for prison sentences of at least six months for criticizing Islam or the king or inciting actions that undermine state security, and it allows fines up to 2,000 dinars ($5,300) for 14 other offenses, including publicizing statements issued by a foreign state or organization before obtaining the consent of the minister of information, publishing any news reports that may adversely affect the value of the national currency, reporting any offense against the head of a state that maintains diplomatic relations with the country, or publishing offensive remarks towards an accredited representative of a foreign country because of acts connected with the person's position.

Government censorship took place. MOINFO representatives actively monitored and blocked local stories on sensitive matters, especially those related to sectarianism and national security or criticism of the royal family, the Saudi royal family, and judges. Journalists also practiced widespread self-censorship. According to some members of the press, government officials contacted editors directly and asked them to stop writing about certain subjects or asked them not to publish a press release or a story. There were reports that the government paid journalists to represent the 2006 parliamentary elections favorably. In addition the Press and Publications Directorate at the MOINFO reviewed all books and publications prior to issuing printing licenses.

A 2006 High Criminal Court injunction against the publication of any news, commentary, or other information, including on the Internet, about a report on election manipulation written by Salah al-Bandar remained in effect at year's end.

The government did not pursue a May 2007 libel complaint against Isa al-Shaiji for articles that allegedly criticized Egyptian Islamic Brotherhood preacher Wagdy Ghunaim's views.

In November 2007 the government began granting licenses previously denied for publication of several books pertaining to Islamic history, modern history of the country, and democracy. At year's end four books were still denied publication.

Internet Freedom

The government restricted use of the Internet. The government was a major shareholder in the Bahrain Telecommunications Company (Batelco), the country's principal telecommunications company, which prohibited user access to Internet sites considered antigovernment or anti‑Islamic. Unlike in previous years, e-mail use reportedly was not monitored. The government continued to invoke the press code to justify the questioning of some journalists and bloggers. By law Web site administrators face the same libel laws that apply to print journalists, and Web masters are held jointly responsible for all content posted on their Web sites or chat rooms.

Most residents had access to the Internet in the home, workplace, or Internet cafes. The number of Internet users increased by 25 percent in 2007, and at year's end there were approximately 86,000 Internet subscribers.

The government regularly monitored and attempted to block local access to numerous Web sites, including local blogs and chat sites, human rights Web sites, sites containing information about Arab Christians, and the Wa'ad political society's Web site. Public discussion of blocked Web sites was widespread. Many users were able to access blocked sites through alternate servers.

On June 22, the prime minister ordered the creation of a committee to monitor Web sites to combat sectarianism and promote national unity and the country's Arab identity. On June 23, the committee, headed by the MOI with MOINFO and MOJIA representatives, ordered three Web sites, two Sunni and one Shia, blocked pending government registration and removal of all sectarian material. The two Sunni sites removed sectarian material and applied for registration, and the government removed the blocks the following day. By year's end the Shia Web site, Awaal.net, had not complied and remained blocked.

On June 28, the government detained six Shia opposition political society members for publishing material on the Internet and in a newsletter that incited "hatred against the government" and sectarianism. Authorities released them after 20 hours. On July 2, the case was suspended in exchange for their promise to post no more inflammatory content.

Academic Freedom and Cultural Events

The constitution provides for academic freedom.

There were no government restrictions on academic freedom or cultural events during the year. However, some academics self-censored, avoiding contentious political issues.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

Freedom of Assembly

The constitution provides for the right of free assembly, but the law restricts the exercise of this right, and security forces intervened in some demonstrations during the year. Organizers must submit requests for public gatherings or demonstrations to the MOI at least 72 hours in advance. Three citizens from the proposed demonstration area must sign the application. If there is no response to the request, the gathering may proceed. The law prohibits public gatherings near hospitals, airports, commercial centers, designated security-related facilities, or funeral processions, as well as gatherings between 11 p.m. and 7 a.m., unless the chief of public security or his deputy permits such in writing. The law states that funeral processions may not be turned into political rallies and that security officials may be present at any public gathering. The head of public security must notify the organizers about any official changes to the request (such as location, time, or route) at least 48 hours prior to the event. Organizers of an unauthorized gathering face prison sentences of three to six months.

The government specifically limited and controlled political gatherings. The law regulates election campaigns and prohibits political activities at worship centers, universities, schools, government buildings, and public institutions. Unlike in previous years, there were no reports that the MOI told mosque leaders and owners of ma'tams (Shia religious community centers) to close their doors to prevent meetings from occurring; however, the government did not allow ma'tams or other religious sites to be used for political gatherings without permission.

On May 15, the Amal political society used a ma'tam for internal party elections. On May 18, the MOJIA charged Amal with violating the law and attempted to have its financial aid suspended for 90 days. Amal appealed, and on October 27, the MOJIA announced it had dropped the case.

Government security forces intervened in some demonstrations during the year.

Antigovernment demonstrations occurred in numerous Shia villages around the country on an almost weekly basis during the year. Bands of Shia youth, allegedly instigated by members of the unregistered Haq movement, regularly appeared at the end of both registered and unregistered demonstrations where, according to Shia community members and MOI officials, they burned tires and trash and threw Molotov cocktails and stones at riot police.

The police often dispersed demonstrations with tear gas. Local human rights NGOs alleged that riot police used tear gas against peaceful demonstrators; however, the MOI countered that it used tear gas in response to attacks by demonstrators. Numerous organizations, including Al Wifaq National Islamic Society, the Bahrain Human Rights Society (BHRS), and the officially disbanded Bahrain Center for Human Rights (BCHR), alleged that MOI forces used rubber bullets to break up demonstrations. Senior MOI officials said the police used only less dangerous rubber baton rounds.

Freedom of Association

The constitution provides for the right of freedom of association; however, the government limited this right in practice. Although the government does not allow the formation of political parties, it authorized registered political societies to run candidates and participate in other political activities.

The government required all groups to register: civil society groups with the Ministry of Social Development (MOSD), political societies with the MOJIA, and labor unions with the Ministry of Labor (MOL). The government decided whether the group was social or political in nature based on its proposed bylaws. The law prohibits any activity by an unlicensed society and any political activity by a licensed civil society group.

To apply for registration, a political society must submit its bylaws signed by all founding members, a list of all members and copies of their residency cards, and a financial statement identifying the society's sources of funding and bank information. The society's principles, goals, and programs must not run counter to either Shari'a law or the national interest as interpreted by the judiciary, and it may not be based on sectarian, geographic, or class identity.

A civil society organization applying for registration must submit its bylaws signed by all founding members and minutes of meetings of the founding committee stating names of founding members, their professions, their place of residence, and containing their signatures. The law provides the MOSD the right to reject the registration of any civil society if it finds the society's services unnecessary, already provided by another society, contrary to state security, or aimed at reviving a previously dissolved society. Associations whose applications are rejected or ignored may appeal to the High Civil Court, which may annul the MOSD's decision or refuse the complaint.

The MOSD continued to deny the National Committee for the Unemployed to register as a civil society group because of the political nature of its activities and the Bahrain Youth Human Rights Society (BYHRS), likely because some of its members were under 18 years of age and because of its ties to the dissolved BCHR. On November 6, the MOJIA filed legal proceedings against the BYHRS president that superceded the November 2007 MOSD case. At year's end the case was pending.

On August 12, the MOSD appointed Fakhria Dairi chairwoman of the Bahrain Nurses Society (BNS) after the BNS failed to hold regular elections in conformance with its bylaws. The BNS subsequently held an election on August 24, which the ministry determined was illegal because the board failed to notify the MOSD in advance. BNS supporters alleged that the ministry enforced the law as punishment for a BNS threat to strike at the largest public hospital.

c. Freedom of Religion

The constitution states that Islam is the official religion and that Shari'a is a principal source for legislation. The constitution provides for freedom of conscience, the inviolability of worship, and the freedom to perform religious rites and hold religious parades and meetings, in accordance with the customs and laws of the country; however, the government placed some limitations on the exercise of this right. The law requires all religious groups to obtain a permit from the MOJIA to operate and hold religious meetings. Depending on a group's activities, it may also need approvals from the MOSD, the MOINFO, and/or the Ministry of Education. The constitution prohibits speech considered blasphemous or anti-Islamic.

The Baha'i congregation, repeatedly denied registration in previous years, continued to gather and worship freely without government interference. Numerous Christian churches operated freely, although several could not successfully register. Most of these cases related to zoning concerns and neighbors' complaints about parking near houses used as unregistered churches. Other religious minorities, including Sikhs and Hindus, practiced freely. Immigrants and noncitizens faced no government restrictions on religious observance.

The government funded and closely controlled all official religious institutions, including Shia and Sunni mosques, Shia ma'tams, Shia and Sunni waqfs (religious endowments), and the religious courts, and it may withhold funding to punish particular individuals or places of worship, although reports of this were not common. New mosques were dependent upon the government's nontransparent land allocation process, and allocation reportedly was not proportionate to the Shia community's relative population in the country. At year's end the MOJIA had not approved an application for a Shia ma'tam that was close to the community in Hamad Town, leading individuals in the community to convert parts of their homes into ma'tams.

Islamic studies are mandatory for all public school students.

The law prohibits proselytizing by non-Muslims; however, bookstores owned by Bahrainis, other Arabs, and other expats openly sold and displayed religious materials, including Christian Bibles, without fear of government intervention or reprisal.

The government scrutinized carefully those who chose to pursue religious study in Iran.

Societal Abuses and Discrimination

Government and societal discrimination against the majority Shia population remained a problem. Sunnis received preference for employment in sensitive government positions and in the managerial ranks of the civil service, and the defense and internal security forces were predominantly Sunni. Unlike in previous years, there were no reports of religious discrimination in university faculty employment. Although Shia citizens held posts in the security forces, with few exceptions positions were not high ranking. During the year the Ministry of Defense did not recruit Shia for military service; however, the MOI made increasing efforts to recruit Shia into unarmed security agencies such as traffic and community police. In the private sector, Shia tended to work in lower-paid, less-skilled jobs. Educational, social, and municipal services in most Shia neighborhoods were inferior to those found in Sunni communities.

The Jewish community had approximately 36 members, one of whom served in the Shura Council until the king appointed her ambassador to the United States on April 22.Some anti-Jewish political commentary and editorial cartoons appeared, usually linked to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, without government response. Although the one synagogue was not open due to the small size of the Jewish community in the country, Jews practiced their faith privately without interference from the government.

For a more detailed discussion, see the 2008 International Religious Freedom Report at www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/rpt.

d. Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of Refugees, and Stateless Persons

The constitution provides for freedom of movement within the country, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, and the government generally respected these rights in practice. The government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees and asylum seekers.

The law provides that the government may reject applications to obtain or renew passports for "reasonable cause," but the applicant has the right to appeal such decisions before the High Civil Court. In practice authorities relied on determinations of national security when adjudicating passport applications.

The constitution prohibits forced exile, and there were no reports of forced exile or return from exile during the year. Some political oppositionists who refused the 2001 amnesty remained in self-imposed exile.

Protection of Refugees

The law does not provide for the granting of asylum or refugee status in accordance with the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 protocol, and there is no system for providing protection to refugees. In practice the government provided protection against the expulsion or return of refugees to countries where their lives or freedom would be threatened.

Stateless Persons

Citizenship is derived from one's parents. By law foreign women who marry citizens are eligible for citizenship after five years of marriage; however, foreign men who marry citizens are not entitled to citizenship, and neither are their children. The Bahrain Women's Society (BWS) reported that there were 128 stateless children in the country. In 2006 King Hamad issued a royal decree granting citizenship to at least 372 children of citizen mothers and noncitizen fathers. However, this action did not change the law, so children born after the decree continued to face statelessness.

The law clearly defines naturalization requirements, but adjudication of naturalization applications was not transparent. Opposition groups claimed that the government regularly ignored naturalization rules to manipulate demographics for voting purposes and to maintain Sunni domination of the police and defense forces. According to these opposition groups, the government was more lenient with naturalization requests from expatriates in the security forces, while Shia and other applicants experienced delays in the processing of their cases. The government occasionally granted citizenship to Sunni residents from neighboring countries. The government stated that some Saudis who had received citizenship were the grandchildren of Bahraini citizens who had immigrated to Saudi Arabia and had a legal right to citizenship. The Ministry of Interior reported that it has naturalized 7,012 persons, including formerly stateless children, since 2003.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government

Citizens do not have the right to change their government or their political system; however, the constitution provides for a democratically elected Council of Deputies, the lower house of parliament. The king appoints the prime minister, who then proposes cabinet ministers. Members of the royal family held all strategic cabinet ministry positions and approximately half of all ministerial slots.

The bicameral National Assembly consists of the 40-member popularly elected Council of Deputies and the 40-member appointed Shura (Consultative) Council. Members of either house may propose legislation, but the Office of Legal Affairs, a quasi-independent body linked to the MOJIA, drafts the actual text of bills. The king may veto bills passed by the National Assembly, which in turn may override a veto by a two--thirds majority vote. If the legislature overrides a veto, the king must promulgate the bill into law within one month. Since the reopening of parliament in 2002, the king has not vetoed any legislation, and the government has not submitted any bill to parliament that a member of either council proposed.

The king may dissolve the Council of Deputies at his discretion. He retains the power to amend the constitution and to propose, ratify, and promulgate laws. Either council may question government ministers, and the Council of Deputies may require a minister's resignation with a two-thirds majority vote of no confidence. The Council of Deputies may introduce a resolution indicating it cannot cooperate with the prime minister, in which case the joint National Assembly would have the option to pass the resolution by a two‑thirds majority, requiring the king to either dismiss the prime minister or dissolve the Council of Deputies. The situation of a no-confidence vote has never arisen.

Elections and Political Participation

All registered political societies, including the four that boycotted the 2002 elections, participated in the 2006 Council of Deputies elections. Although no international observers participated, the government permitted nine local civil society groups, including the Bahrain Human Rights Watch Society (BHRWS) and the Bahrain Society for Public Freedoms, access to poll stations to observe voting. The Bahrain Transparency Society and the BHRS joined efforts to form the Election Monitoring Joint Committee (EMJC) and trained more than 200 local observers. The government asked a foreign organization involved in political party training and election observation to leave the country during the campaign process and elections.

In its February 2007 report, the EMJC stated there were no widespread attempts to influence the outcome of the elections, although it noted that candidates did not cease campaign activities 24 hours prior to the polls as required by law. Official polling station observers did not report significant problems during the voting process, although there were allegations that in some cases the government may have manipulated general poll center vote counts against opposition candidates in close races. The opposition also alleged that the government gerrymandered the districts to protect Sunni interests.

The government did not allow the formation of political parties, but 15 political societies, which received some government funding and operated like political parties, chose candidates for parliamentary and municipal elections, campaigned for political office, developed political platforms, held internal elections, and hosted political gatherings. Political societies were highly critical of provisions in the law requiring them to notify the MOJIA before contacting political groups abroad.

The law prohibits civil society groups from engaging in political matters; however, the government permitted such activity at its discretion.

There were 10 women in the Shura Council and one in the Council of Deputies. Two women served as cabinet ministers, three women sat as judges in the criminal courts, and one was a judge in the constitutional court.

Shia and Sunni citizens have equal rights before the law; however, Sunnis dominated political life even though Shia comprised the majority of the citizen population. Twenty Shura Council members were Shia Muslims, 19 were Sunni, and one was Christian. Four of the 23 cabinet ministers were Shia, including a deputy prime minister.

Government Corruption and Transparency

The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption; however, the government did not always implement the law effectively, and some officials reportedly engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. Significant areas of government activity continued to lack transparency. The annual National Audit Bureau report released on November 7 analyzed the accounts of state-owned entities and alleged that oil revenue of more than 232 million dinars ($615 million) was unaccounted for.

On February 25, the Lower Criminal Court found an officer and a manager of the parastatal ship-building company Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard guilty of embezzlement and misuse of company charge cards and sentenced them to one year's imprisonment, suspended, and three years' imprisonment, respectively. The government increased official supervision of the company by appointing the director of customs as chairman of the yard's board.

On November 16, the Lower Criminal Court sentenced the manager of a cleaning company to three years' imprisonment and a 5,000 dinar ($13,250) fine for attempting to bribe the new minister of municipalities. His lawyer immediately appealed the case, and the appeal remained pending at year's end.

In June 2007 the Ministry of Industry and Commerce filed a complaint with the public prosecution accusing nine employees of embezzlement. A few days later authorities arrested the individuals. The court released the nine on bail, and the case remained pending at year's end.

The law does not provide citizens access to government-held information or require government officials to provide financial disclosures.

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

Restrictions on freedom of association and expression hindered investigation or public criticism of the government's human rights policies; however, local and international NGOs published reports on human rights during the year. There were three major human rights groups that reported on issues of concern: the independent BHRS, which was widely viewed as allied with the socialist legacy party Wa'ad; the BHRWS, which considered itself independent, although some leaders were also members of the appointed Shura Council and its former president was appointed in April as an ambassador; and former members of the dissolved BCHR, which often coordinated its activities with the unregistered oppositionist Haq movement.

In recent years the government has allowed increased interaction between local civil society groups and international human rights organizations. During the year citizen members of Amnesty International, who have not registered as an NGO with the MOSD, carried out several activities without interference by the government.

On January 24, the Public Prosecution authorized the BHRS to visit some detainees from the December 2007 riots, as long as physicians did not accompany the BHRS. On January 26, the public prosecutor withdrew permission when the BHRS insisted that physicians accompany the inspection team.

On April 27, the government submitted its report as part of the UN's periodical review of human rights. Some human rights NGOs, including the BHRS, BHRWS, Bahrain Transparency, and members of the disbanded BCHR, alleged that the government did not inform them of the deadline for submission of concurrent reports. The NGOs attended the review and submitted their own reports.

Although the law prohibits foreign NGOs from registering with the government, the government generally did not interfere with their activities provided it did not perceive these activities as interfering in the political system. In previous years the government provided written warning to foreign NGOs it believed had interfered in internal political matters. In 2006 the government declined to renew the residence permit of an NGO chief who had become the focus of controversy, with the result that the NGO's local office closed. The NGO resumed operations in 2007 from a regional hub office located outside the country, and in partnership with a local NGO.

Section 5 Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons

The constitution provides for equality, equal opportunity, and the right to medical care, welfare, education, property, capital, and work for all citizens. However, these rights were protected unevenly, depending on the individual's social status, sect, or gender.


Rape is illegal; however, the law does not address spousal rape. The press reported cases of men arrested for the crime, including a few cases in which fathers of rape victims sought lighter sentences for perpetrators. There was no information on the number of rape and sexual assault cases brought to the public prosecutor or any resulting convictions.

No government policies or laws explicitly addressed domestic violence against women. Spousal abuse of women was widespread, particularly in poorer communities. Women rarely sought legal redress for violence, and there was little public attention devoted to the problem. The Batelco Care Center for Family Violence continued to offer free medical, psychological, legal, and social assistance to victims of violence, primarily women and children, and it operated an abuse hot line that recorded 728 cases involving domestic abuse during the year.

Prostitution is illegal, but it occurred. Most prostitutes were expatriate women, and some were victims of trafficking. Customers were primarily expatriates.

Sexual harassment is prohibited but remained a widespread problem for women, especially foreigners working as domestics and in other low-level service jobs. The press reported a number of cases of men arrested for sexually harassing women.

Women faced discrimination under the law. Women have the right to initiate a divorce; however, religious courts may refuse the request. In divorce cases the courts routinely granted mothers custody of daughters under age nine and sons under age seven. Custody usually reverted to the father once the children reached those ages. Regardless of custody decisions, the father retained guardianship, or the right to make all legal decisions for the child, until the child reached the age of 21. A noncitizen woman automatically loses custody of her children if she divorces their citizen father without just cause. A Muslim woman can legally marry a non-Muslim man if the man converts to Islam.

Women may own and inherit property and represent themselves in all public and legal matters. In the absence of a direct male heir, Shia women may inherit all property; however, Sunni women without a direct male heir inherit only a portion as governed by Shari'a, while the brothers or male relatives of the deceased divide the balance. In practice better-educated families used wills and other legal maneuvers to mitigate the negative effects of these rules.

Labor laws prohibit discrimination against women; however, discrimination against women was systemic in the country, especially in the workplace. The influence of religious traditionalists sometimes hampered women's rights. According to the Central Bank, women constituted 16 percent of the private sector workforce and 46 percent of the government workforce in 2007.


The government generally honored its commitment to children's welfare through enforcement of related civil and criminal laws and an extensive social welfare network. Children born to citizen mothers and noncitizen fathers were not entitled to citizenship and were not eligible for certain social services.

According to the BWS, child abuse was common. The BWS "Be Free" Campaign, which has sponsored a Web site for victims of child abuse since 2002, reported that during the year it received between 300 and 400 e-mails per month from persons reporting to have been victims of child abuse.

Trafficking in Persons

On January 8, the government enacted a comprehensive law that prohibits all forms of trafficking in persons; however, there were reports that persons were trafficked to and through the country.

The country was a destination for persons trafficked from Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Horn of Africa, and the former Soviet Union. Reports also indicated that the country was a transit point for workers from these regions to Europe. Some victims were trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation, but victims were most commonly trafficked for unskilled construction and domestic labor.

According to the Migrant Workers Protection Society (MWPS), the principal traffickers were illegitimate recruiting companies in source countries. Traffickers used debt bondage, contract substitution, and threats of legal action against their victims. The MWPS reported that victims often recruited additional victims from their home regions in an attempt to pay off debt.

Under the January 8 antitrafficking law, traffickers face fines of between 2,000 and 10,000 dinars ($5,300 and $26,500) and mandatory prison sentences of up to 10 years for each offense, and anyone who trafficks a person on behalf of a corporation faces a fine of up to 100,000 dinars ($265,000) and the same mandatory prison sentences. "Aggravating circumstances," including if the victim is a woman or less than 15 years of age, double the fines and prison sentences.

On December 23, the government found Arfa Ching guilty of trafficking in persons and sentenced her to three and a half years' imprisonment and a 5,000 dinar ($13,250) fine.

The government established a 10-person unit within the MOI's Criminal Investigation Directorate to combat trafficking in persons. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) headed a committee that set trafficking policy and included representatives from the Ministries of Interior, Justice, Information, and Social Development, as well as the Labor Market Regulatory Authority (LMRA) and three NGOs. The MOSD headed another committee charged with evaluating and determining the status of victims, which included representatives from the MOFA, MOI, and the LMRA.

Fear of deportation or employer retaliation deterred many foreign workers from making complaints to the authorities. Many foreign workers were unaware of their rights under the law. The government published pamphlets on expatriate workers' rights in several languages, provided manuals on these rights to local diplomatic missions, and operated a telephone hot line for victims.

On July 1, the LMRA implemented new visa rules for migrant workers in the public and private sectors to reduce the incidence of employers holding workers' passports or otherwise restricting their movement. The new rules also targeted the illegal practice known as "free visas," whereby a sponsor enabled a laborer to enter the country under the cover of working for the sponsor and then allowed the worker to find other work, at an often exhorbitant fee payable to the sponsor.

During the year the government shelter for abused and migrant women housed women who ran away from employers. The government also collaborated with a foreign NGO to help train its antitrafficking unit and personnel at its shelter for female migrant workers.

The State Department's annual Trafficking in Persons Report can be found at www.state.gov/g/tip.

Persons with Disabilities

The law protects the rights of persons with disabilities, and a variety of governmental, quasi‑governmental, and religious institutions are mandated to support and protect persons with disabilities. New public buildings in the central municipality must include facilities for persons with disabilities. The law does not mandate access to nonresidential buildings for persons with disabilities.

There were no reports of discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment, education, or access to health care. Children with learning disabilities, physical handicaps, speech impediments, and Down syndrome were enrolled in specialized education programs in public schools.

The law requires the government provide vocational training for persons with disabilities who wish to work. The law requires any employer of more than 100 persons to hire at least 2 percent of its employees from the government's list of workers with disabilities; however, the government did not monitor compliance. The government placed persons with disabilities in some public sector jobs.

National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities

The law grants citizenship to Arab applicants who have resided in the country for 15 years and non-Arab applicants who have resided in the country for 25 years. However, there was a lack of transparency in the naturalization process, and there were reports that the citizenship law was not applied uniformly. For example, there were allegations that the government allowed expatriate Sunni Arabs who had served less than 15 years in the security services to apply for citizenship. There were also reports of Arab Shia who had resided in-country for more than 15 years and non-Arab expatriates who had resided more than 25 years who had not been granted citizenship.

In past years the government offered citizenship to several thousand stateless "Bidoon" persons, mostly Shia of Persian origin. However, according to Freedom House, Bidoon and citizens who spoke Farsi as their first language continued to encounter discrimination in the society and work force.

Other Societal Abuses and Discrimination

The law does not criminalize homosexual relationships between consenting adults of at least 21 years of age.

While discrimination against homosexuality and HIV/AIDS was not common or apparent, both attributes were socially taboo and not widely covered in the media.

Section 6 Worker Rights

a. The Right of Association

The law grants workers, including noncitizens, a limited right to form and join unions. Members of the military are prohibited from joining unions. Public sector workers may join private trade unions and professional societies, but public sector unions are illegal. The General Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions (GFBTU), which all unions were required to join, recognized seven public sector unions that the government considered illegitimate. Approximately 28 percent of the private-sector labor force was unionized. The GFBTU did not report any government interference in its private sector activities, and the law restricted the right to strike.

The law allows for the establishment of additional federations; however, there were none. The law prohibits unions from engaging in political activities.

The law holds the right to strike is a legitimate means for workers to defend their rights and interests; however, this right was restricted. The law prohibits strikes in certain vital sectors, which, by decree, include the oil, gas, education, telecommunication, and health sectors, as well as pharmacies and bakeries. For workers permitted to strike, the law requires arbitration before a vote to strike and a two-week notification that a union intends to strike. Although government sources held that the arbitration provision did not preempt the right to strike, the law does not clearly specify that a union may proceed to a strike vote if it disagrees with the arbitrator's decision.

In July 2007 Batelco fired two trade-union organizers, including the union's vice president, for engaging in a work stoppage that it deemed in violation of the ban on such action in the telecommunications sector, even though the union did not call for or attempt a strike. On March 12, Batelco reinstated the employees in compliance with a court order.

b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively

The law provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively. Employers and the government are required to treat unions as independent judicial entities. Unions did not generally practice collective bargaining. In the private sector, the law prohibits antiunion discrimination and employer interference in union functions, and the government generally protected this right. The law also provides protection to workers terminated for their union activities.

On July 23, employees of the public bus company Cars went on strike to demand higher wages. At the behest of the government and GFBTU, the workers successfully employed collective bargaining and achieved a salary increase. Although strikes in the transportation sector are prohibited, the government did not enforce the prohibition.

There are no special laws or exemptions from regular labor laws in export processing zones.

c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

The law prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including by children; however, there were reports that such practices occurred, particularly in cases of domestic workers and those working illegally. There were no reports of forced or compulsory child labor.

Foreign workers, who made up 59 percent of the workforce (78 percent of the private sector workforce), in some cases arrived in the country under the sponsorship of an employer and then switched jobs, while continuing to pay a fee to their original sponsor, which made it difficult to monitor and control their employment.

In numerous instances employers withheld salaries from their foreign workers for months and even for years and refused to grant them the necessary permission to leave the country. The government and the courts generally worked to rectify abuses if they were brought to their attention, but they otherwise focused little attention on the problem. The fear of deportation or employer retaliation prevented many foreign workers from making complaints to the authorities.

Labor laws do not fully cover domestic workers. There were numerous credible reports that domestic workers, especially women, were forced to work 12 to 16 hour days, given little time off, were malnourished, and were subjected to verbal and physical abuse, including sexual molestation and rape. Between 30 to 40 percent of the attempted suicide cases handled by the government's psychiatric hospitals were foreign domestic workers.

d. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment

The law protects children from exploitation in the workplace and prohibits forced and compulsory child labor, and the government enforced this prohibition effectively.

The minimum age for employment is 16 years of age. The MOL makes rare exceptions on a case-by-case basis for juveniles between the ages of 14 and 16 who have an urgent need to assist in providing financial support for their families. Minors may not work in industries deemed hazardous or unhealthy by the Ministry of Health. When employed, minors may work no more than six hours a day and may be present on the employment premises no more than seven hours a day. These regulations do not apply to family-operated businesses in which the only other employees are family members. MOL inspectors enforced child labor laws effectively in the industrial sector; child labor outside that sector was monitored less effectively, but it was not believed to be significant outside family-operated businesses. Even in such businesses, it was not widespread.

e. Acceptable Conditions of Work

There is no national minimum wage. Unskilled foreign laborers in particular did not earn as much as the guidelines suggested. The law allows employers to consider benefits for foreign workers such as annual trips home, housing, and education bonuses as part of the salary.

The MOL enforced the labor law and mandated acceptable conditions of work for all adult workers, except domestic workers, including a maximum of 48 hours per week. Except for Muslims during Ramadan when work should not exceed six hours per day and 36 hours per week, workers are entitled to one day of rest after six consecutive days of work and to annual paid vacations of 21 days after one year of service. The labor law for the private sector permits 12 hours of overtime per week that is to be paid at a rate of 25 percent above the normal wage if conducted during the day and 50 percent if completed at night. Special MOL permission is required for anyone working more than 60 hours per week. The Labor Inspectorate conducted periodic, comprehensive inspections of private sector enterprises, including verification of employee hours and wages.

Workplace safety standards are adequate, but inspection and compliance were substandard. The MOL set occupational safety and health standards and sporadically enforced them by performing workplace inspections. The ministry employed a team of eight engineers from multiple specialties that it trained as safety inspectors and gave the authority to levy fines and close work sites if employers did not improve conditions by specified deadlines. During the year the press reported several workplace deaths owing to a combination of inadequate safety procedures, worker ignorance of those procedures, and inadequate safety standards for equipment, but exact figures were not available. Trained inspectors visited labor camps to verify if workers' accommodations met required safety and hygiene standards. During the year, inspectors visited 1,287 labor camps, of which 106 failed the inspection because of safety issues such as gas and electricity problems, overcrowding, poor hygiene, and the general state of disrepair. Inspectors cited poor hygiene in warnings issued to 126 camps, as well as part of their rationale for the closure of 23 camps. The inspectors were authorized to inspect only premises that had a commercial registration, not private homes, where most domestic workers resided and worked, or unregistered "private" camps, where many unskilled laborers lived.

Reports of employers and recruiting agencies beating or sexually abusing foreign women working in domestic positions were common. Numerous cases were reported to local embassies, the press, and the police; however, most victims were too intimidated to sue their employers, although they had the right to do so. If the victim brings a suit against the employer, the plaintiff cannot leave the country for the duration of the case. The MWPS continued to support several victims who took their cases to court, but compensation to victims was reportedly very low.

When a worker lodges a complaint, the MOL opens an investigation and often takes remedial action. The MOL reportedly received 3,426 complaints during the year, including those from domestic workers. On average there were nine complaints from domestic workers per month. Ministry officials said that they were able to resolve more than half of these cases through mediation in the ministry. The public prosecutor took up the remaining cases for investigation. Complaints brought before the MOL that cannot be settled through arbitration must be referred to the court within 15 days.

A few companies still transported expatriate workers in open trucks on benches, despite a ministerial decree banning the practice. Accidents, sometimes fatal, resulted. On April 13, the cabinet approved a decree instructing all companies to transport workers in buses, prohibiting even covered trucks, by the end of the year.

A ministerial decree prohibits outdoor work between the hours of noon and 4 p.m. during the months of July and August. As a result, health officials reported a decrease in the number of heatstroke cases from 1,154 cases in 2007 to 981. According to the MOL, it fined 26 companies between 50 to 300 dinars ($132 to $792) per worker for allegedly violating the ban during the year, an increase from 21 in 2007.


2 Mar, 2009

Invitation to Press Conference on :Bahrain: Paradoxes of the Kingdom of Silence

Lord Avebury, the Vice-Chairman of the Parliamentary Human Rights Group

Cordially invites you to a Press Conference on

Bahrain: Paradoxes of the Kingdom of Silence

The ongoing popular uprising has exposed disturbing realities evidenced by neutral monitors at recent trials of opposition figures who had ventured to speak out. 12.00 PM, Wednesday 8th April 2009 . Room 134, Millbank House (Annexe to The House of Lords, London SW1P

For further information please contact: Lord Avebury: 020 7274 4617, Email: ericavebury@gmail.com

27 Feb, 2009

Arrests and accusations based on sectarianism Closure of blogs, online forums and websites of Shiite villages and institutions

Arrests and accusations based on sectarianism Closure of blogs, online forums and websites of Shiite villages and institutions Encouraging preachers and writers who incite sectarian hatred against Shias and their beliefs

Bahrain: 27 February 2009

In the context of increasing sectarian discrimination being implemented by the Bahraini authorities, heavily armed Special Forces attacked Shiite while performing the evening prayer on the curb outside the perimeter of of Al-Sadiq mosque which was besieged early this afternoon. The prayers, men and women, came to pray outside the mosque when the access to the mosque was blocked by the foreign mercenaries who started firing rubber bullets and chemical tear gas on them. This incident after the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs and the Ministry of Interior have issued orders to ban prayers and preaching in the evening of each Friday in Al-Saddiq mosque in Bahrain's capital Manama. This marks a new escalation which affects the freedom of religion of Shiite citizens. The decision was enforced when a large number of the Special Security Forces, made up of non-Bahraini mercenaries, besieged the Mosque on the afternoon of Friday 12th February 2009. The Friday communal prayer is led by Sheikh Abdul-Hadi Al-Mokhodhur, succeeding the well-known activist Hassan Mushaima, the general secretary of the "Haq" Movement for Liberty and Democracy.

Since Monday 26th January, the government has arrested almost 20 activists, among them three of the leaders of Haq Movement. Among the charges include forming an un-licensed organization that aims at incitement against the regime and encourages hatred against it. However, the arrests and charges only included the members which are of the Shia sect, and did not include the other leading members of the same movement who are of the Sunni sect.

The prohibition of prayer in the Shia mosque was preceded by the issuance of ministerial order number 2 for the year 2009, by the Minister of Justice and Islamic Affairs, regarding the control of religious discourse. This order effectively targets and restricts the content of speeches and discussion forums in Shiite religious institutions, exclusively. Staff, sermons and speeches in Sunni mosques fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs, unlike Shiite religious institutions (mosques and Matams), which have long remained independent both financially and politically.

Hand in hand with the repression and controls placed on Shiite religious discourse, the BCHR has received several complaints that the authorities are turning a blind eye to Salafi preachers in certain Sunni religious insititutions, who speak in extremist sectarian terms and incite sectarian clashes and hatred against the Shia. At the forefront of these preachers – a previous and current Member of Parliament who has a close relations with the royal Court – is Jassim Al-Saeedi, whose speeches promote the idea that Shias are akin to Zionists.

This policy of restricting religious freedom coincides with an edict by the new Minister of Information, Sheikha Mai Al-Khalifa (a member of the Royal Family), which has banned numerous websites, including Shiite dialogue forums concerned with religious, cultural, social and political matters, or online forums for Shiite areas and villages. At the same time, the authorities have not extended the ban to web forums dedicated to slandering Shiite citizens and their religious and political beliefs, and that encouraging hatred against them. It is believed that those particular 'anti-Shia' websites are financed and managed by the foreign media department of the Ministry of Information, within a secret network revealed by the former government adviser Dr. Salah Al-Bandar. This team appears to work as part of the Ministry of Information, however its work is closer to the State Security Unit (for Intelligence), and it works on smearing the image of the Shiite citizens at the regional and international level, by using modern technology. This department is headed by Sheikh Abdullah bin Ahmad Al-Khalifa, the former president of the State Security Unit. The State Security Unit is currently headed by Sheikh Khalifa bin Abdullah Al-Khalifa – the former president of the same team at the Ministry of Information.

Furthermore, several journalists associated with pro-government newspapers have repeatedly slandered Shiite citizens and their beliefs, and have smeared their image before local and international public, and continue to incite hatred against them. This smear campaign is carried out by a number of Arab journalists and media consultants from other Arab countries, (among them Egypt and Jordan), who are brought to Bahrain by the authorities, and awarded for this role with permanent residency and Bahraini citizenship. The former government adviser had published details and documents in relation to that.

Last January the Bahraini authorities used special security forces to remove slogans and black flags that the Shiite usually hang in their local areas and institutions during the religious observance of Ashoora. Members of the Special Security Forces tore down those banners and slogans in front of the people of Der, Karzakan, Musala and Belad Al-Qadeem in order to provoke them and insult their beliefs. (See photo attached.)

The Bahrain Center for Human Rights expresses its deep concern regarding the continuous escalation by security forces, as part of a sectarian programme, which targets Shia citizens in all fields. The Center fears that the authority’s sectarian policy may drive the country to further deterioration in its overall stability.

Therefore, the Center calls for the following:

1. To put an end to all the provocative practices and policies which restrict Shiite citizens religious freedoms, and calls on the authorities to respect their religion and their right to freedom of religious practice, as stated in international conventions.

2. To cease the targeting political activists and human rights defenders based on their sectarian belonging, and to release all human rights and political prisoners and to drop all charges against them.

3. To bring an end to the policies and practices revealed by Dr. Salah Al-Bandar revealed – Bahrain’s former government adviser – which foments and encourages sectarian discrimination and elimination, and to bring the perpetrators of that plot to justice.

4. To respect and maintain the freedom of expression according to the standards stated in the international covenants and charters, especially the ones the Bahraini government has committed to, and to amend Bahraini laws in accordance with those covenants.

27 Feb, 2009

Judicial harassment and slander campaign orchestrated against several human rights defenders

February 24, 2009

The Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, a joint programme of the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), has received new information and requests your urgent intervention in the following situation in Bahrain.

New information:

The Observatory was informed by the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights (BCHR) and the Bahrain Human Rights Society (BHRS) about the judicial harassment and slander campaign orchestrated against Mr. Abbass Abdul Aziz Al-Omran, BCHR Administrative Board member, Mr. Abduljalil Alsingace, Head of the Human Rights Unit of the Haq Movement for Civil Liberties and Democracy in Bahrain, Mr. Hasan Mushaima, Secretary General of the Haq Movement of Civil Liberties and Democracy, Mr. Mohamed Habib Al-Meqdad, a Shia religious scholar, Mr. Abdul-redha Hassan Al-Saffar, a human rights defender well-known for his role in organising peaceful sit-ins in collaboration with the families of detainees and the Unemployed Committee, Mr. Ali Mushaima, a former leading member of the Unemployed Committee living in the United Kingdom as political refugee, and Mr. Abdulraoof Al-Shayeb, former President of the National Committee for Martyrs and Victims of Torture living in the United Kingdom as political refugee.

According to the information received, on February 23, 2009, the Grand Criminal Court in Manama started the trial of 35 people, including Messrs. Abbass Abdul Aziz Al-Omran, Abduljalil Alsingace, Hasan Mushaima, Mohamed Habib Al-Meqdad, Abdul-redha Hassan Al-Saffar, Ali Mushaima, and Abdulraoof Al-Shayeb, following the indictment No. 1403/2008 issued by the Public Prosecutor on February 10, 2009, and related to the alleged “terror plot” uncovered by the Bahraini authorities mid-December.

All 35 are accused of “joining a group that was established against the provisions of the law, and whose aim is to undermine the provisions of the Constitution and laws and to prevent the public authorities from fulfilling their work, and to abuse personal liberties and the public rights of citizens, including through terrorism” and through the mentioned group “to carry out terrorist operations that target crucial sites and public facilities, and the populated places in the Kingdom of Bahrain and to assault officers and members of the police force, with the purpose of undermining security and public order and to cause instability in the country and to cause damage to the economic viability with the knowledge of that group’s aims”, pursuant to Article 58 of the 2006 Counter-Terrorism Law and the 1976 Penal Code. Defendants other than Mr. Al-Omran were also charged with other similar charges that are punishable by up to life imprisonment.

Though an investigation has been going on for several months and several persons have been arrested since December 16, 2008, it is the first time that the name of Mr. Abbass Abdul Aziz Al-Omran appears in relation to this case. He has never been summonsed for interrogation. Nonetheless, according to the lawyer of Mr. Mohamed Habib Al-Meqdad, in detention since January 26, 2009, the Public Prosecutor brought a fabricated statement by Mr. Abbass Omran to Mr. Mohamed Habib Al-Meqdad in which the former accused the latter.

According to the information received, some of the accused reported during the hearing that they had been exposed to torture and coerced into making false confessions. They also stated that they were not informed that their false confessions would be shown on national TV. They reported that those who coerced their confessions told informed them that they were going to talk to a personality who would convey their apology to the King.

The Observatory expresses its deepest concern about the judicial proceedings against the above-mentioned Bahraini human rights defenders and fears that the Bahraini authorities is resorting to a strategy of intimidation, with the support of the 2006 Counter-Terrorism Law, to repress human rights defenders for their legitimate human rights activities.

The Observatory fears that the mentioned defenders have been targeted to deter them from pursuing their human rights activities, and urges the Bahraini authorities to put an end to all forms of harassment against them, in line with the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 9, 1998.

Background information:

On December 15, 2008, the authorities staged a wave of arrests to later announce uncovering an alleged “Terror Plot”. Approximately twenty youths involved in social protest movements were arrested and detained incommunicado until December 28, 2008. According to the detainees’ lawyers, the detainees showed signs of ill-treatment and torture during interrogation.

On December 28, 2008, a Government-owned and run TV “Bahrain Satellite” channel broadcast a pre-recorded video displaying unrelated images of violence amidst confessions of some of the detainees. The second day, daily newspapers showed publication of these confessions, names and pictures of thirteen of the youths, among them those shown in the TV broadcast.

One of the detainees, Mr. Hasan Ali Fateel - a former member of the Unemployed Committee - stated in his confession that Mr. Abdulhadi Al-Khawaja, former President of the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights (BCHR) and Protection Coordinator at Frontline, had encouraged the unemployed in 2006 to organize a series of sit-ins near the Royal Court and the House of Representatives, without making any relevant connection with the alleged terrorist scheme. He also mentioned the names of Mr. Hasan Mushaima and Dr. Alsingace as being instigators for demonstrations and public protests. Other detainees stated in their broadcast “confessions” that they had been instigated and instructed by Messrs. Mohamed Habib Al-Meqdad, Ali Ahmed, Ali Mushaima, a former leading member of the Unemployed Committee living in the United Kingdom as political refugee, and Abdulraoof Al-Shayeb, former President of the National Committee for Martyrs and Victims of Torture living in the United Kingdom as political refugee, to carry out planned acts of terror. All are well known, outspoken and leading participants in activities involving the promotion and protection of human rights, in particular the question of the equality in the enjoyment of economic, political and social rights in Bahrain, particularly in relation to the Shi’a minority.

Messrs. Ali Mushaima and Abdulraoof Alshayeb are now UK residents as they enjoy political asylum status after fleeing repression of the local authorities due to their human rights activities. Before and after the announcement of the alleged “Terror Plot” in December, the Bahrain authorities have been unsuccessfully exerting diplomatic pressure on the British authorities to have their political refugees status nullified in the UK.

On January 26, 2009, Messrs. Abduljalil Alsingace, Hasan Mushaima and Mohamed Habib Al Meqdad were arrested by elements of the intelligence police and subsequently detained incommunicado. The former was released the following day from the Dry Dock detention centre.

Actions requested:

Please write to the authorities of Bahrain urging them to:

Ensure that the physical and psychological integrity of Messrs. Abbass Abdul Aziz Al-Omran, Abduljalil Alsingace, Hasan Mushaima, Mohamed Habib Al-Meqdad, Abdul-redha Hassan Al-Saffar, Ali Mushaima, and Abdulraoof Al-Shayeb be guaranteed in all circumstances;

Immediately release Messrs. Hasan Mushaima, Mohamed Habib Al-Meqdad and Abdul-redha Hassan Al-Saffar, since their detention is arbitrary as it seems to merely aim at sanctioning their human rights activities;

Order a thorough and impartial investigation into the above-mentioned ill-treatments, in order to identify all those responsible, bring them before a civil competent and impartial tribunal and apply to them the penal sanctions provided by the law;

Put an end to all forms of harassment, including judicial harassment, against them as well as against all human rights defenders in Bahrain;

Conform with the provisions of the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 9, 1998, in particular its Article 1, which provides that “everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to promote and to strive for the protection and realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the national and international levels”, as well as Article 12(1) that provides “everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to participate in peaceful activities against violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms”, and Article 12(2) (“the State shall take all necessary measures to ensure the protection by the competent authorities of everyone, individually or in association with others, against any violence, threats, retaliation, de facto or de jure adverse discrimination, pressure or any other arbitrary action as a consequence of his or her legitimate exercise of the rights referred to in the present Declaration”);

Ensure in all circumstances respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with international human rights standards and international instruments ratified by Bahrain.


Cheikh Hamad bin Issa AL KHALIFA , King of Bahrain, Fax: +973 176 64 587

Cheikh Khaled Bin Ahmad AL KHALIFA, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tel: +973 172 27 555; Fax : +973 172 12 6032

Cheikh Khalid bin Ali AL KHALIFA, Minister of Justice and Islamic Affairs, Tel: +973 175 31 333; Fax: +973 175 31 284

Permanent Mission of Bahrain to the United Nations in Geneva, 1 chemin Jacques-Attenville, 1218 Grand-Saconnex, CP 39, 1292 Chambésy, Switzerland. Fax: + 41 22 758 96 50. Email: info@bahrain-mission.ch


Paris-Geneva, February 24, 2009

Kindly inform us of any action undertaken quoting the code of this appeal in your reply.

The Observatory, a FIDH and OMCT venture, is dedicated to the protection of Human Rights Defenders and aims to offer them concrete support in their time of need. The Observatory was the winner of the 1998 Human Rights Prize of the French Republic.

To contact the Observatory, call the emergency line:

E-mail: Appeals@fidh-omct.org

Tel and fax FIDH + 33 (0) 1 43 55 20 11 / +33 1 43 55 18 80

Tel and fax OMCT + 41 (0) 22 809 49 39 / + 41 22 809 49 29

L‘OMCT a son siège à Genève, en Suisse. Elle coordonne le réseau SOS-Torture composé de 282 organisations régionales et internationales dans 93 pays sur cinq continents. Contact : omct@omct.org

24 Feb, 2009

Press TV:Nabeel Rajab:Discrimination and sectarian oppression in Bahrain, a systematic reality

Mon, 23 Feb 2009 16:47:39 GMT By Nabeel Rajab

Is there a Shiite-Sunni dispute in Bahrain?

First of all, I have to clarify that the current dispute in Bahrain is not a sectarian Shiite - Sunni dispute or an ideological dispute at all. On the contrary, the dispute is between the Shiite sect, and they are the largest portion of the indigenous people in Bahrain and the regime because of its policy in sectarian discrimination, segregation and apartheid. The authority tries hard to picture the dispute as if it were a dispute between Shiites and Sunnis, It even drives it to be so.

The Bahraini society has a high degree of religious tolerance among all its segments, despite their religious, sectarian and ethnic background. We as Bahraini people are proud of this combination of beliefs and ethnic homogeneity which contributed and enriched building the prevailing civilization and culture in the country since hundreds of years. This even distinguishes our citizens from the others in the [Persian] Gulf region.

Shocking BCHR Report

Days ago, we released the results of our second report on sectarian discrimination, and before that, there was our first report for the year 2003 and which was one of the reason for closing down the Bahrain Center for Human Rights.

As for the main results, which were included in the second report, that while the Shiites form approximately two thirds of the population, they only fill 13% of the senior position in Bahrain, and most of these posts are based in service institutions or the non-prevailing institutions.

In many important ministries and government institutions, the Shiite citizens fill 0% of the senior posts and these institutions are:

1. Ministry of Defense 2. National Guard 3. Ministry of Interior Affairs 4. Ministry of Cabinet Affairs 5. The General Organization for Youth and Sports 6. The Royal Court 7. The Crown Prince Court 8. The Central Informatics Organization 9. Survey and Land Registration Bureau And Finally 10. The Supreme Defense Council

This Supreme Council is regarded as the highest security body in the country, meant for decision-making during crisis. This council is formed of 14 members of the ruling family only, and is headed by His Majesty the King and includes in its membership the Prime Minister who is the King's uncle and the Crown Prince who is the son of the King and the heads of the important ministries.

Based on the report of the former adviser Dr. Salah Al-Bandar, the Supreme Council is responsible for laying out a secret plan that considers the Shiite citizens as a threat to the regime, and upon that, a secret network was established headed by member of the ruling family in order to isolate them from all aspects of life.

It was also noted that the Shiite sect form 5% of the judiciary corps, 16% of the diplomatic corps, 7% of the Ministry of Transportation, 18% of the Constitutional Court, 10% of the Ministry of Finance and 6% of the Ministry of Information.

As for the ministerial positions, there are only five ministers of the Shiite sect in the current government among 25 ministers and 3 of those are ministers without ministries . This percentage is the lowest representation of the Shiites in the government since the independence and establishment of the first executive body for the government in January 1970.

Is there a relation between the marginalization of the Shiites and between their level of education or lack of efficiency?

The ruling elite at first absolutely denied the existence of sectarian discrimination; however, the report that was published by the BCHR in 2003 created a shock to the Bahraini society and a surprise to the government, due to it consisting figures and information on sectarian discrimination. Since that time, the ruling elite has been changing its defense strategies in this regard. After it was denying the existence of discrimination in first place, it started justifying it in attempt of proving the saying that there is a lack of qualified people in the Shiites sect, and their low level of education. This is what the authority is trying to let pass lately to its visitors of foreigners and regional and international institutions, as we have noticed through our work at the international level or through some of the column writers that are close to the authority.

In the meantime - as human rights activists - we do not accept these justifications or arguments that contradict logic. We, however, looked into that matter as well and have found that the percentage of Shiites in the lists of honour graduates of boys and girls from high schools for the years 2006 and 2007 are approximately 78%, and that the Shiites form 70% of college students. This conflicts the government's claims of them being incapable or inefficient to fill government posts. The results actually confirm that there is a big gap between the percentages and numbers of educated citizens of the Shiites sect and between their employment in government institutions.

The aspects of discrimination in Bahrain are numerous and are not limited to what we mentioned. There is, in addition, marginalization in the distribution of scholarships, and in building mosques, and in the services provided to their areas and in dealing with the case of the people deprived of the citizenship.There are still many families deprived of the citizenship and They have not received a Bahrain citizenship only due to their sectarian background, noting that they and their parents were all born and grew up in this country, and where the country openly and without shame brings tenth of thousands of members of tribes from some of the Arabic and Asian countries and grants them the Bahraini citizenship in an illegal way.

Why was this period chosen to bring forth the sectarian discrimination issue?

In our previous report for the year 2003, we warned of slipping into violence and counter-violence, as the ruling elite did not put an end to the discrimination policy. In a related context, the International Crisis Group issued a report in the year 2005 in which it also warned of the seriousness of the situation if the government continued in its marginalization policy against the Shiites. However, the Bahraini government responded by closing down the BCHR and ignored all the warnings. Here we are today witnessing what we warned of in the past of almost daily clashes and confrontations between the people of the Shiite towns and villages and the special forces, who are brought as by the Bahraini government as foreign mercenaries.

Now, after 5 years of issuing the first report, and under the King's so-called reform project and with the existence of a parliamentary institution, it became clear that the situation has worsened significantly. The percentage of Shiites representation in the country's institutions is deteriorating and on the decline. After the figure was 18% in the year 2003, it became now 13%, which is equal to a deterioration of 5% in the last five years.

The BCHR is following and with deep concern that clarity that the ruling elite is ensuing in the policy of marginalization on the educational, economic, political, cultural, religious, social and civil level, neglecting all international appeals and recommendations, including the ones issued by the United Nations.

Introducing this report was a result of us being aware of the seriousness of the current situation in Bahrain, and the probability of it turning into a conflict more violent than ever.

We wonder, are we asked to wait for Bahrain to turn into an area of civil conflicts and war? As is the situation in Iraq or Darfur, until we begin to act to set the situation right?

The cleansing crime in Bahrain which is practiced today by the ruling elite sets the foundations, basis and fuel to these clashes, paving the way for a civil war between the citizens.

The Accusation of the Shiites being politically loyal to Iran

If these claims were true, then that means that the regime in Bahrain suffers from a legitimacy crisis, as the Shiites who are more than two thirds of the Bahraini population would be disloyal to it. The account is not so, the ruling elite is working on taking advantage and manipulating the international disputes and contradictions to firmly continue the marginalization of the Shiites. The ruling elite works on taking advantage of the bad relations between Iran on one side and the US and Israel on the other side, in order to publicize to the world the issue of the Shiites' loyalty to Iran to gain sympathy and support from those countries to its policy towards the Shiites.

However, the question is, until when will the ruling elite depend on those international disputes and contradictions, to justifies its oppression against the people? Is there anyone who can guarantee that the map of international relations always remains the same?

The discrimination issue against the Shiites is not a new phenomenon, it started when the rulers of the country invaded Bahrain, more than two centuries ago, and has no relation with Iran who only formed its modern state in the last 30 years.

The British colonizer's existence in Bahrain helped in reducing the discrimination policy against the Shiites at the beginning of the last century. However, since its independence in the early 70's and the return of the reign in the hands of the ruling elite, the policy started gradually once and again. This policy became even more aggressive, systematic, organized since the King Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa came in power.

Are Shiites threatening the regime in Bahrain as is alleged?

It is absolutely apparent that the ruling class in Bahrain is living a state of fears and delusion, that the Shiites forms a threat to the Ruling family. However, the reality is not so, up till this moment there are no political opposition forces in Bahrain - Shiite, Sunni, or National - that threat the regime, or that fight over the reign. All the demands are limited to the participation in decision-making, the justice in distributing the wealth, equal citizenship, criminalizing discrimination, equality in opportunity and respect for human rights.

Nevertheless, the continuous of this unjust policy pushes some groups of citizens - out of frustration - to carry out extreme means in expressing their demands, or it may drive others to ask for help from other countries. If we do not want these matters to move into this direction, we should reform our home, now and not tomorrow. Time, in the light of international changes, is beginning to run out.

However, we totally believe that one of the main reasons for the spread of sectarian discrimination, is our negative attitude ignoring to present it, and being ashamed of indicating it even by those groups affected by it, in fear of being accused by the authority and its associates that we are sectarian and work for Iran.

We, in the BCHR, have a moral, ethical, legal and humane commitment that the campaign against the sectarian discrimination is one of our priorities in the coming months or years, on the local, regional and international level.

The author is the president of Bahrain Center for Human Rights (BCHR).

Note: Articles published in this section do not necessarily reflect Press TV's views.


24 Feb, 2009

Bahrain: A Hunger Strike That Might Turn to a Civil Movement

A hunger strike by eight prominent figures in Bahrain, which started on February 13th, has attracted several thousands of supporters who visited the place where the strike is held in Nuwaidrat, a village South West of the capital Manama.

Abdul-Jaleel Al-Meqdad (a senior Shiite religious scholar), Abdul-Wahab Husain (well-known political activist), Abdulhadi Alkhawaja (former president of the Bahrain Center for Human rights), AbdulJaleel Al-Singace (head of the human rights committee at Haq-movment), and four other Bahraini figures started the hunger strike as a protest against the general deterioration of human rights conditions in Bahrain and to demand the release of around 100 detainees. These detainees are said to be arrested due to their human rights activities or for practicing there rights in freedom of opinion, freedom of organization and freedom of assembly.

The participants in the hunger strike announced that it is only one of a series of steps to be taken and announced yesterday that they intend to end their hunger strike on Tuesday, February 24th, in a rally where they will announce their following move. Two of the participants, AbdulJaleel Al-Singace and Abdulhadi Al-Mokhodar, were transferred to Al-Salmania Medical Complex (SMC) to receive medical treatment due to severe hypoglycemia, hypotension, and generalized fatigue.

Several hundreds of people visited the place of the hunger strike every day showing support to the participants including several delegations representing different Shiite cities and villages in Bahrain. Scores of well-known figures and delegations of opposition political groups and non-governmental societies including human rights groups also attended to show their support. Three parallel rallies organized in the same area to support the strike attracted thousands of supporters on the 23rd, 17th and 20th of February. Speeches and statements during rallies and meetings were discussed, amongst other issues, turning this wide support into the start of civil movement.

For more information, please contact:

Organization committee, Tel: +973 39121674

Direct contact to participants:

In Arabic:

· Abdul-Wahab Husain: Mobile: + 973 39400 720

In English:

· Abdulhadi Alkhawaja: Mobile: + 973 39400 720

· Abdul-Jaleel Al-Singace: Mobile: + 973 39668179

More information on the detainees and human rights situation could be found on: www.bahrainrights.org

23 Feb, 2009

ARTICLE 19 concerned about upcoming trial of activists Hasan Mushaima, Mohamed Habib Al-Muqdad and Abdul-Jalil Alsingace

Bahrain: ARTICLE 19 concerned about the upcoming trial of Bahraini Activists

ARTICLE 19 has been following with concern the cases brought against three Bahraini activists in relation to their publishing activities and speeches about the political situation in Bahrain. Mr. Hasan Mushaima, Mohamed Habib Al-Muqdad and Dr Abdul-Jalil Alsingace are due to appear in court on Monday, February 23 2009, for charges related to violating anti-terrorism and criminal laws.

The three activists, arrested on January 26, 2009, have been charged with several offences under the Bahrain Penal Code (Articles 160 and 165) and Article 6 of the Bahrain Terrorism Code of 2006, that carry a penalty of up to five years and life imprisonment respectively. These are "forming an organisation, outside the provisions of the law, which disrupts the provisions of the Constitution or prevents any of the State enterprises or public authorities from exercising their duties", "provoking hatred of the regime" and "inciting violence and the overthrow of the political system". Mr. Mushaima and Mr. Al-Muqdad are still held in custody, while Dr. Alsingace was released on bail but officially banned from travel out of Bahrain.

ARTICLE 19 is concerned about the vagueness of the provisions of the Penal and Terrorism Codes that are being used as a basis for the prosecution of the three Bahraini activists. On the face of it, these provisions are overbroad and include illegitimate restrictions on the rights of freedom of association and of freedom of expression. The anti-terrorism provisions have also been a subject of criticism by the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism.

ARTICLE 19 welcomes Bahrain's commitment to introduce political and democratic reforms in the country and the steps the country has taken in this direction. We call on the Bahraini authorities to further strengthen this commitment by bringing its legislation to compliance with international human rights law and standards on freedom of expression and the right to assembly. We also urge the Bahraini authorities to ensure that the trial of the three activists meets international standards of fairness and transparency, in particular, the right to challenge the lawfulness of the detention, the presumption of innocence, the right to examine or have examined all witnesses and the right to a fair hearing.

Updates the Hasan Mushaima, Mohamed Habib Al-Muqdad and Abdul-Jalil Alsingace cases: http://www.ifex.org/en/content/view/full/100645/


For further information, contact Hoda Rouhana, MENA Programme Officer, ARTICLE 19, 6-8 Amwell Street, London, EC1R 1UQ, U.K., tel: +44 20 7278 9292, fax: +44 20 7278 7660, e-mail: hoda@article19.org, info@article19.org, Internet: http://www.article19.org



- JOINT ACTION: Twenty IFEX members around the globe denounce jailing of activists for expressing their views

21 Feb, 2009

The Public Prosecution charges human rights defenders with serious accusations based on Terrorism Law

Human rights defender Abbass Omran brought to trial without investigation The Prosecution faces one of the detainees with fabricated confessions taken from Omran The Public Prosecution charges human rights defenders with serious accusations based on Terrorism Law 16 February 2009 The Bahrain Center for Human Rights (BCHR) expresses its deep concern for including the name of its board member, the human rights defender Abbass AbdulAziz Al-Omran amongst the indictment which the Public Prosecution brought to the Grand Criminal Court on 10 February 2009 in case number 1403/2008, with charges relating to the alleged reveal of a “terror plot”[i]. This is not the first time that Abbass Al-Omran gets targeted because of his activity in the human rights field, especially in the committees he helped the BCHR to establish, among them the Unemployed and Low-waged Committee, the Martyrs and Victims of Torture Committee, and the Families of the Detainees Committee. Noteworthy, Abbass Al-Omran carries a membership in the BCHR since the first year of its establishment in 2002, and he became a member in the BCHR’s administrative board since October 2008. The BCHR believes that targeting Abbass Al-Omran goes back to his continuous and effective activity in the human rights field. The Center is stunned by the Public Prosecution, who arrested a large number of people who were accused in this case and interrogated them since the last December, 16, however, did not at any time summon Abbass Al-Omran for interrogation or even call him. He travelled normally through Bahrain’s Airport to London twice on 18 December 2008 and another time when he was sent by the BCHR on 28 January 2009. The Prosecution did not make any contact with him before he found his name being published among the indictment dated on 10 February, to be brought to trial with the others on Februray 23, 2009. The BCHR is surprised that the Public Prosecution – according to one of the lawyers – faced one of the detainees, Sheikh Mohammed Habib Al-Muqdad, with a “confession” against him by Abbass Al-Omran, while the fact is that Abbass Al-Omran was neither arrested nor interrogated, which indicates the kind of methods that the prosecution office resort to in order to pressurize the detainees. According to the indictment, the Public Prosecution accused the detainees, among them Abbass Omran, of the charge that they: “Joined a group that was established against the provisions of the law, its aim is to disable the provisions of the constitution and laws and to prevent the public authorities from practicing their work, and to abuse personal liberties and the public rights of citizens, while terror is one of its means in achieving its aims; and that they joined the mentioned group to carry out terrorist operations that target important sites, public facilities, and the populated places in the Kingdom and to assault officers and members of the Police Force, with the purpose of undermining security and public order and to cause instability in the country and to cause damage to the economic viability with their knowledge of that group’s aims”. It is an accusation based on law number 58 of the year 2006, regarding protecting the community from terrorist acts and it is the law that was condemned by the UN’s Special Rapporteur and several international non-governmental organizations. The indictment includes the names of 35 activists and human rights defenders, among them; 1. Thirteen Bahrainis whom the indictments says are fugitives, among them – in addition to Abbass Al-Omran – two other human rights defenders who have recently obtained political asylum in Britain and they are Abdul-Raoof Al-Shayeb, the former president of the Martyrs and Victims of Torture Committee, and Ali Hassan Mushaima the administrative member in the Unemployed and Low-waged Committee. 2. Nineteen Bahrainis who were arrested during the past two months. The indictment said that they are still imprisoned, among them Hassan Mushaima, the General Secretary of the Movement of Civil Liberties and Democracy (Haq), the cleric defending human rights Sheikh Mohammed Habib Al-Muqdad, and the human rights defender Abdul-Ridha Al-Saffar, the activists in the Families of the Detainees and the Unemployed Committees[ii], 3. Three Bahrainis who were released after ending the investigation with them, among them Dr. Abdul-Jalil Al-Singace, president of the human rights committee in Haq Movement, The charges in this case were based on: 1- the Penal Law for the year 1976 which restricts liberties and punishes practicing them, and 2- the Terrorism law for the year 2006, in which sentences reach life imprisonment, such as article 6 of the law. The Bahrain Center for Human Rights urgently demands the following: 1. The release of all detainees in this case, specially Abbas Omran and other human rights defenders, as the facts indicate that the motives of their arrest is due to their work in defending human rights and/or them practicing their basic rights to freedom of association, assembly and freedom of expression. 2. Drop all the charges, and stop the trials which will not provide the conditions of a fair trial, because the terrorism and penal laws oppose the international standards, and the lack of impartiality and independence of the judiciary. 3. Stop targeting human rights activists, by smearing their reputation, or accusing them of terrorism, or arresting them and exposing them to torture and ill-treatment. 4. To annul the terrorism law and to amend the Penal Law in accordance with the international conventions and obligations. 5. To bring anyone involved in those violations to trial, and to compensate the affected.