REFORM IN BAHRAIN
On the Path towards Democracy
Dr Salah Al Bander
Secretary General
GCDD

American Enterprise Institute
Washington DC, 13 February 2007

Thank you, Chairperson Ms Pletka,

I want to commend the AEI for holding this discussion panel about the Reform in Bahrain. We express our appreciation for this opportunity to speak to you today about our efforts to let Bahrain become a sustainable, striving, and stable democracy.

Let me start, distinguished ladies and gentlemen, by going straight to the heart of the matter by saying that work, like this today, should continue to drive for dismantling the structures of containment, institutional discrimination and exclusion in Bahrain. Of course, it would be in everyone's interest if conflict could be prevented before it broke out. Timely preventive measures are far easier and cheaper in political and human terms than efforts to try to stop or slow down confrontation once it has begun.
Let me say, also, that the Bahrain reform experiment has come a long way since the 1990s. Despite everything, the recent elections are one more major milestone on the path of democratisation in Bahrain.

The 1990s Bahrain is perhaps a classic example for a benchmark and merits serious consideration when we talk about democratic change in Arabia. We have to take into consideration the ruling families in the Gulf as a prime source of instability and oppression toward their citizens.

That period has demonstrated in stark terms the need for better risk assessment. It was vital to establish an early policy formulation within the Government of Bahrain, the opposition structures, and by the strategic partners of Bahrain: The American Administration here in Washington.

At the moment Bahrain's experiment with political reforms is facing serious, perhaps insurmountable risks and hurdles. Its progress towards the promised Constitutional Monarchy will continue to move backwards and becomes even slower after the 2006 elections. In my judgement, for the foreseeable future, however, we have little else to expect but witness a slowdown, and even complete reversal, of the so-called "the Reform Project by HM the King".

One of the greatest threats to democratic governance in Bahrain is the alarming discovery of the “Secret Organisation” in August 2006 and the revealing operating plans in January 2007. It has a 5-years detailed action plan designed in order to ensure Sunni domination over the country’s majority Shiites.

The official response to this ugly, Sectarian Apartheid is deliberate efforts to discredit the GCDD and avoid facing the serious issues raised by the reports.

Crises sometimes happen to be turning points in history, serving as eye-openers that stimulate a fundamental reversal of behaviour. In the case of Bahrain it reflects a unique reality always mixing the dangers of crises with the opportunity for change. As we all recognised in this room today Bahrain reform has reached a cross-roads.

It is clear that wise decisions and calculated moves taken by the opposition will determine whether the country is able to continue its authoritarian regime with a period of stability, peace and welfare, or whether this time it will simply experience a painful revival of the mid 1990s, therefore following Iraq’s example.

King Hamad is avoiding the public vision that is well recognised in the National Charter, as a Bill of Rights. He is doing so by establishing an underground system, which makes it possible for the Royal Court to avoid the legitimate accountability, and strengthen outright control of the civic society while maintaining a positive image abroad as a model Constitutional Monarchy.

In this context, it is possible to speak of a Control System, consisting of dominance over political actors, institutions, and over the rules of the democratic game: the 4 basic elements are:
 a strong central system of governance linked directly to the Royal Court along with the active weakening of all other institutions, including the elected ones (Municipalities and Parliaments, trade unions, associations) and the judiciary.
 Full control over the media in order to govern public opinion.
Control over all aspects of elected bodies, converting them from being a tool to express the will of the people into a means of legitimising the decisions made by the regime.
 Weakening the civic society so that it can no longer fulfil its function in the system and is being gradually replaced by substitutes of bogus NGOs that are absolutely dependent on the system and do not have an independent foundation.

We witnessed the regime's pre-emptive tactics to contain change before the elections and we are going to witness even more during the 2007. For example from the saga of the Constitution to strengthening the Government's powers and decreasing the powers of Parliament, amending the election rules to ensure a stable set of loyalists, adoption of tougher media control, restricting, de-legalising and even criminalising certain types of civil society activities. Last but not least, exploiting the instrument of sectarian tension: that is, manipulation of public consciousness and collective memory to instigate public fear, spreading stereotypes, and lies about the domestic opposition.

What the election period and after exposed clearly is the extreme reliance of the regime on a central system of manipulation based in the Royal Court over political actors, institutions and the rules of the game.

The core objectives of the Royal Court are, FIRST, strengthening the powers of the Supreme Defence Council alongside the weakening of all other institutions; SECOND, complete dominance and control over the opposition, and THIRD, ultimate control over the elected Council of Representatives, turning the winning of the opposition to 63% of the votes from a means of empowerment of the people into the means of legitimisation of the regime's decisions.

The year 2006 is marked by a whole set of failures by AlKhalifa's regime, and brought further changes in the direction of outright authoritarianism. This, indeed, well documented in the reports of AI, HRW and the American DOS Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour annual report on Human Rights Practices published by the March 2006.

And I am sure that my colleagues Mr Al-Khawaja and Dr Toby Jones will elaborate further on these issues.

Continuation of offsetting reforms since 2003, and intensified pressure on civil society should be highlighted in this respect. Nevertheless, the overall situation caused by the wider political participation of the opposition forces gave more room for much more optimism with regard to the prospects of democratic change in Bahrain. It showed more developed forms of political participation, stronger feelings of citizen competence and higher level of civic culture.

Indeed, with the decreasing support base of the regime, more than 98% as reflected in the massive popular National Charter referendum of the 2001 to less than 37% of a core political base of minority Muslim Brotherhood and Wahabi socities after the 2006 election is a case for reflection.

Looking from the outside at what has been going on in the country over the last 5 years, it is clear that Bahrain's experiment is in BAD shape more than anyone could imagine.

The 2006 events also pulled off the beautiful public relation masks and revealed the ugly and vicious mugs underneath. For the overwhelming majority it was the real face of reforms. It showed a regime with institutional tools of exclusion and outright discrimination against the majority of its citizens. Of course, many people knew the reality behind the masks was not quite the same, BUT 2006 sudden confrontation with that reality was for many people profoundly shocking, including myself, and a challenge to action.

Years ago my professor at Cambridge said to me "AlKhalifa rule for the last 300 years yielded only crude force, that the appeal to moral sense, to justice, to fair play, was completely worthless and out of their consideration. I remember, I differed with him then. I hope that I will find one reason today as not to accept, even in part, his wise judgement.

Bahrain is now firmly at the league of few states that democracy promotion groups are increasingly confronting not only outright repression, but the efforts, largely associated with authoritarian regimes, committed to undermining, countering and reversing democratic changes. As the GCDD reports revealed the tools of exclusion seem to be not only well-endowed with repressive capabilities and financial means, but also with the intellectual resources.

On the other hand, it is reasonable to say that there are 3 surprising circumstances that are clear now in Bahrain:
 Radicalisation of the democratic forces, and in a broader sense, a larger part of the community affected by repression is very clear about its awareness and understanding of the challenges that are confronting;
 Ability of civil society to spontaneously organise around more focused issues and political campaigns and even direct actions;
 Limitation on the regime's ability to restrict access to information.

One part of the purpose of today’s meeting is to hear more about the bilateral relationship between America and Bahrain and how we view the long term constructive engagement between them in order to ensure the stability and security of the country in the post-2006 election period.

As we all remember in May 1996, four Saudi men were publicly executed for bombing the al-Uliyya US mission in the Saudi capital, al-Riyadh. This was the first public political execution since the takeover of the Makkah Grand Mosque in 17 years earlier. A month later another attack took place in al-Khobar Towers. In both cases the Saudi corrupt regime managed to convince the Americans that they were victims like them and it is nothing to do with their tyrany. Five years later there was 9/11 and the rest is history.

Since 2001, Bahrain is considered a major non-NATO ally and hosts the US Navy's 5th Fleet with its rising role in the regional conflicts: Iraq, Afghanistan and Iran. The Free Trade Agreement followed and October 2006 was a turning point in the alliance with US. For the first time the Bahrain Royal Navy, unlike other Gulf States, participated effectively on the "Leading Edge" operation off the Iranian waters which consisted of an interception of a ship carrying nuclear materials for a country that wanted to build a nuclear capability. Today, Bahrain Royal Court is very happy to be seen as a closer ally to the Free world.

Bahrain and Kuwait have a significant Shi'a community and both know very well that if they allied with US position they could face serious domestic unrest and political instability. This is the reason behind the recent extensive exchange visits between the ruling families of Kuwait and Bahrain. Bahrain is putting a lot of pressure on Kuwait in order to positively mediate with Washington in order to allow the King further space to deal with the rising tide of internal opposition as a threat to its own national security and American interests. It intends to persuade the American Administration that they are victims to a bunch of militant Hizbullah-like fanatics. The Royal Court is urging America and the free world to keep silent towards the intension of the King to crush the opposition in the near future, possibly before this summer. If Washington accepted the Royal Court position it will have lasting implications for Bahrain, the Gulf region, the United States, and beyond.

The most serious issue which nobody likes to talk about is the current marriage of convenience between the Royal Court, the minority Muslim Brothers and the Wahabis in order to contain the majority of the political opposition under the guise of combatting the Shi'a and Iranian plots. This will no doubt destabilise the whole Middle East and possibly far beyond.

The plans of the Secret Organisation up front looks as if it concerns a Sunni block against a Shi'a block. However, the intention is far beyond Bahrain.

Bahrain is the capital of Islamic banking. From Bahrain the Muslim Brothers and the Wahabiis control a network of 300 Islamic financial institutions in 40 countries. Since 9/11 this network is growing by more than 20% annually. Today they control total assets of more than 300 Billion Dollars. 70% of all deposits in the 6 GCC countries are now in the hands of these Islamic Banks and by 2013 will be more than Trillion Dollars.
The political objective is to fully control the administration of these resources, the sooner the better.

It is important to mention here that it is much easier for a Shi'a to join the Royal Guard or the Bahrain Defence Force than any of these Banks. It is exclusively run by and through a network of patronage connected directly to Sunni Islamists in these countries.

The political reconstruction process since 2001 reached its end by December 2006. Five years of political tension and setbacks were deepened rather than defused by the 2006 election.

Bahrain still faces many challenges before democratic governance is secured. The current diplomatic efforts by the Royal Court to win Washington approval, actively or passively, for its bending oppressive measures against the civic society should not be allowed. The American Administration must continue to be engaged positively with developments in Bahrain and protect the fundamental rights of the people if the factors contributing to its instability are to be proactively solved.

Unfortunately, the setbacks to reform are closely associated to the development of the closer ties between Bahrain and the US.

So, WHAT IS WAITING FOR US IN 2007 AND BEYOND?
Looking to the future, what is being done to inspire trust in the path toward democracy?

The MOST critical issue is to inspire the confidence of the people in the integrity of the recent elections, and a belief that voting is worthwhile. The second most critical is NOT to allow the King to use the current regional tension as an excuse to crush what ever is left of his reform project.

On the other hand, there are signs that the Council of Representatives might become more factionalised and vulnerable to manipulation by the Royal Court. There is great possibility that is going to be dissolved by the King sooner than we can imagine. What remains to be seen is the impact which this will have on developing viable democratic institutions that can effectively govern the people that they are meant to serve.

The Government of Bahrain will continue its policy to do more than block all the possibilities for the elected opposition members, both in the municipalities and the parliament, to take part in decision-making. It will continue also its policy of marginalising and controlling the role of the trade union movement. Interestingly, trade unions have more membership than the all political societies put together.

The fact remains that a stable Bahrain will require a serious effort from the international community to support the civil society, reject all methods of its control, and force the cooperation of the Royal Court in that direction.

With the set of passed laws, an extensive security network, and the mercenary forces at hand the Royal Court has turned the political system into a pressure cooker. Indeed, by insisting on implementing the published strategy of the Secret Organisation they will keep turning up the heat. This will ultimately lead to more radicalisation of the opposition itself, development of its mass popular mobilisation and organisation skills and influence leading to the eruption of violence or chaos.

However, it is clear to me it is a matter of life and death that the regime increases the elements of stability and flexibility by listening to the will of the people. The Government needs to re-establish communication with the legitimate demands of the majority community (70% of the population), and break the vertical power of the Royal Court system into 5 flexibly unconnected and independent horizontal powers.

But there is another threat to Bahrain reform, Ms Chairperson, as you have indicated. One that could kill it immediately is the silence of the US about the outright problems that were well reviewed and documented in the DOS 2005 annual report, and the one which is due next month. What is critical here not just the listing of them: ACTION is needed to change them.

Bahrain needs badly an American engagement that will strengthen the derailed reform process, empower civil society institutions, and provide a measure of accountability for facing the serious challenges and dangers that lie ahead.

There is a great need now to let the elected representatives, despite the limitations, play a more positive role at all levels of policymaking, and to send the energy of social conflict flowing into legitimate channels, stop immediately the tactics and tools that undermine the process, and give up throwing new barriers in the face of democratic forces.

The rule of law must improve, transparency, and a hands-off approach by the Royal Court, if the people were to have confidence in, and participate in, the road towards democracy.

A lack of success in these areas will undermine the credibility of the democratic process and may risk demoralising the aspirations of the majority of citizens and jeopardise their ability to actively shape and strengthen representative governing institutions. Then this is the obvious real threat to American interests in Bahrain.

If America ignores the Saudi case and continues to ignore our appeals, the risk is that the political system will collapse completely and will become too obvious. Sadly, the Royal Court continues blindly in precisely the wrong direction. However, the writing is on the wall, the regime must give way in due course to democratic participation if it is not to collapse.

The political reconstruction process since 1999 reached its starting of the end by 2002. Four years of political tension were defused by the 2006 election and the participation of the major opposition forces. However, Bahrain still faces many challenges before democratic governance is secured. The international community must continue to be engaged with developments in Bahrain if the factors contributing to its instability are to be proactively solved.

Bahrain needs badly an engagement that will strengthen the derailed reform process, empower civil society institutions, and provide a measure of accountability for facing the serious challenges that lies ahead.

I do believe that democratic transformation is a gradual process. It requires more than just free elections: It requires just and fair elections, civil liberties, the rule of law, independent judiciary and effective, horizontally accountable institutions, free civic society including the media, and more importantly civilian control over the military and security forces. Bahrain has a long way to go!! What is going in Bahrain today makes a mockery of democratic norms and values.

Ms Chairperson, ladies and gentlemen,
Let me finish by saying: Old attitudes in the Gulf States die hard. The ruling families have always been suspicious, and often rather frightened, of that non-reliable, alien and unpredictable form of people participating in managing power and resources.

Thanks for your kind listening.